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ABSTRACT 
This work aims at exploring the relation between Mercosur’s political agenda on borders and the 
local interactions at these spaces in the light of the ‘left turn’ in South America (2002-2014). This 
brief conjuncture analysis found that the ‘regionalism by the left’ did not foster structural 
changes in Mercosur nor resolved issues of coordination necessary for the border, 
regionalization dynamics to leave the informal sphere in which they reside.  
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RESUMO 
Este trabalho objetiva explorar a relação entre a agenda política do Mercosul no tocante a 
fronteiras e as interações de nível local nesses espaços sob a lógica da ‘virada à esquerda’ na 
América do Sul (2002-2014). Concluiu-se que o ‘regionalismo pela esquerda’ não fomentou 
reformas estruturais, nem solucionou problemas de coordenação, ambos necessários para que as 
interações na fronteira deixassem a esfera da informalidade. 




The present work aims at briefly exploring the relation between Mercosur’s 
institutional political agenda concerning borders and border regions (top-down 
regional relations) and the local interactions at the ‘micro’-level border regions as 
producers of demands (bottom-up regional relations) in the light of the ‘left turn’ in 
South America, in the period of 2002-2014. Beyond the institutionalist analysis, 
understanding the ‘vertical relations’ between different levels of the regional process 
requires looking into the specificities of regional dynamics influenced by the rise of 
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progressive (leftist)2 governments in the mentioned years. Thus, the objective of this 
work is to explore some of the consequences of this intertwined, intricate, and uneven 
construction of South America as a region, and more specifically, of Mercosur. 
That is to say that the investigation will not focus on the processes of 
institutional (re)construction of Mercosur. Rather, it will aim at the functioning of 
such institutions that were, in the investigated years, subject to this diverse regional 
environment, which was built by and through the relations among leftist presidents 
and their interaction with society at local level. 
In order to do this, the article will be divided in three main sections. Firstly, it 
is necessary to make some conceptual and analytical clarifications on the regionalist 
process for the case under this work’s focus. Secondly, the article will concentrate on 
the analysis of the consequences of the ‘left turn’ to regionalism in South America and, 
more specifically, to Mercosur. Thirdly, this work will put light into the already 
established institutions within Mercosur that aimed at furthering border integration 
through the perspective of the politics generated by the presence of progressive 
governments. Lastly, some final remarks will conclude this study. 
 
Conceptual and analytical clarifications 
 
Borders, here defined as international limits between states, lie in the center 
of regionalism and regionalization processes due to its singular, diversified, and 
symbolic roles (HEYMAN & SYMONS, 2012) through which diverse informal social, 
political, economic, and cultural interactions occur. The concept of ‘regionalization’, in 
turn, should be understood as the “informal process of regional interaction (economic, 
social, cultural, etc.) that takes place beyond the strictly national borders” 
(CABALLERO, 2015, p. 44). Regionalization happens then at the local level, as de facto 
cooperation or integration takes place. These local interactions (bottom-up regional 
processes) generates an intricate space – the border region – in which local 
populations are interrelated. 
                                                        
2 The development of this analysis does not imply a clear definition of ‘left’. Rather, the important aspect to 
be analyzed here is the self-perception of elected presidents as ‘progressive’ or as ‘to the left’ of the political 
scale. 
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Moreover, there at the border and within the border region “national and 
subnational governments share responsibilities and jurisdictions, and […] regional 
organisms play a role of creating norms and of facilitating local processes of 
cooperation and/or integration” (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015a). In other words, 
borders are also a space in which regionalism takes place. ‘Regionalism’ here should 
be defined as “a political project tending to stimulate integration that is, based on the 
political will of the parties.” (CABALLERO, 2015, p. 44) Regionalism, thus, functions at 
the top-level of formal political relations. It is also important to note that regionalism 
strongly depends, in the case of South America and principally in Mercosur3, on 
diplomatic negotiations among leaders of the Executive of each country involved in 
the process. 
Border regions are, in this context, a central element to comprehend the 
regional space socially constructed by both formal and informal interactions (see 
SÖDERBAUM, 2013). Also, they are a space of ambiguity, since regionalism and 
regionalization function under different logics. For example, it is plausible to infer 
that, within the regional dynamics of South America, if a group of presidents (and 
other top-level policymakers) share as many opinions as possible about a political 
project, regionalism will likely succeed. That is to say that the ‘left turn’ is expected to 
facilitate the furthering of regionalism. 
On the other hand, regionalization at border regions had happened, is 
happening, and will happen beyond the top-level agreements engendered by 
policymakers, although it is somewhat limited by them. Yet, local cross-border 
interactions, although informal (and at times illegal) have been used as a source of a 
regional identity construction, as an origin of shared values and culture, as a basis of a 
Mercosurness, and above all, as a space for the strengthening of the regional organism. 
The relationship between regionalism and regionalization, hence, implies a complex 
web of top-down and bottom-up regional negotiations (vertical relations) through 
which political and economic actors, as well as civil societies construct a region 
beyond (but also through) the process of institutionalization. 
 
                                                        
3 See Malamud (2003) for a thorough analysis on the relation of ‘presidentialism’ and the development 
of Mercosur as the most important regional organism in South America. 
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The progressive regional agenda 
 
After more than a decade under the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ (from 
the end of the 1980s to the 2000s), which promoted neoliberalism and its economic 
and social policies, South America experienced the rise of governments of progressive 
sensibilities throughout the continent. The ‘left turn’, as the phenomenon was called, 
had a double effect on South American regionalism and regionalization: on the one 
hand, it gave the general feeling of a ‘regional left’ among presidents of the continent, 
and incorporated an amplified notion of the purposes of cooperation and integration. 
On the other hand, it implicated the politicization of regional interactions, even more 
visible in the case of Mercosur, which experienced the sudden increase of intra-bloc 
divergences (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA & CULPI, forthcoming). 
The massive presence of governments to the left of the political prism altered 
the regional political landscape as well as gave place to a new wave of institutional 
change both in structures of national governance and within regional dynamics and 
organisms, which is particularly visible in the case of Mercosur4. One could argue that 
the transformation trend initiated by the ‘left turn’ in South America was limited 
primarily to the domestic sphere of each country, especially in regards to new modes 
of State intervention. Nevertheless, the inter-State, intergovernmental character of 
South American regionalism in general – and the strong dependence on presidential 
diplomacy, especially in the case of Mercosur (cf. MALAMUD, 2003) – ratified the 
alteration in the status quo for regional policies, as leftist presidents met favorable 
conditions to engender a new agenda focused on the ideas of social development and 
regional autonomy (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA & CULPI, forthcoming). 
Among the views shared by the progressive elected presidents, it was central 
to the ‘left agenda’ the need for reformulating the role of the State, its optimal 
dimension, and its intervention mode (COUFFIGNAL, 2013). Although marked by a 
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Kirchner (2003) and Cristina Kirchner (2007, 2011) in Argentina; Lula da Silva (2002, 2006) and 
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2013, Maduro assumed the position). Outside of Mercosur, the left has won presidential elections also 
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high degree of heterogeneity, leftist governments agreed on the necessity of fighting 
inequality and underdevelopment (DABÈNE, 2012b). Similarly, they all converged on 
the essentiality of a more pluralized international relations with less interference of 
the United States and other great powers in the continent (SANTANDER, 2009). In 
sum, regional projects of the left were, to a certain extent, in the origin of a paradigm 
change, as they proposed a post-commercial, post hegemonic regionalism5. (DABÈNE, 
2012a) 
The redefinition of the raison d’être of the State put in motion a tendency for 
regulatory policies by which States designed its strategy with the objective of 
responding to social demands (COUFFIGNAL, 2013). The emergence of the left, in this 
sense, revealed “an underlying trend toward the emergence and mobilization of social 
and political currents” (BEASLEY-MURRAY, CAMERON & HERSHBERG, 2010, p. 2). In 
the perspective of regional politics, borders and border regions became fundamental, 
especially for the undergoing change of Mercosur, as the intense de facto border 
integration and the rise of demands at the local level called for ‘regulatory framework’ 
(see DE LOMBAERDE, 2010). 
The redesign of the role of the State took many forms and shapes, as different 
governments attempted to find a proper solution to each domestic experience. This 
was what the Ibero-American General Secretariat (IAGS), in the Asunción Declaration, 
referred to as a reform toward “comprehensive processes and strategic planning” 
(SECRETARIA GENERAL IBEROAMERICANA, 2011, Article 9), and also what Cervo 
and Bueno (2011) called ‘logistic paradigm’ of the State in regards to Brazilian foreign 
policy. 
The political will to change the functioning mode of the State also raised 
interest on decentralization processes, by which governments would become closer to 
citizens and to their demands, and through which State-level decisions would be 
better translated into local practices (COUFFIGNAL, 2013). Historically, however, the 
few isolated local social policies promoted by national governments did not show to 
                                                        
5 Even if scholars usually take Unasur and Alba as the most emblematic cases of post-hegemonic, post-
commercial/post-liberal regionalism (RIGGIROZZI, 2012; SANAHUJA, 2009), one cannot ignore the 
institutional transformation of Mercosur in the same period and the socio-political origins of such a 
change that it shared with the other two regional organisms, namely the specific political and 
ideological synergies generated by the ‘left turn’ in South America. 
Conjuntura Global, vol. 4 n.3, set./dez., 2015, p. 390-402. 395 
 
be effective for responding to the demands of local populations, let alone of citizens of 
Mercosur’s borders and border regions. 
In the period studied, South America watched a propagation of decentralized 
cooperation/integration projects in the heart of the majority of its regional organisms. 
Mercosur, in turn, searched on amplifying its involvement on the theme by creating 
the Advisory Forum of Municipalities, Federated States, Provinces, and Departments 
of Mercosur (FCCR) with the objective of connecting regional objectives of the 
members of the bloc with demands and aspirations of subnational entities 
(MERCOSUR, 2010). In sum, ‘micro’ scale became more relevant as the member States 
of Mercosur attempted to find new approaches to regional governance regarding local 
populations’ needs at its international borders and border regions. 
In the investigated years, Mercosur managed to establish a series of changes 
within its structure and to create new institutions to meet the regional demands. The 
signature of the Consenso de Buenos Aires, in 2003, by the Argentinian president 
Néstor Kirchner and president Lula da Silva, of Brazil, set in motion the creation of 
several institutions within Mercosur, based on a regional development strategy. 
Among them, it is important to highlight the Permanent Court of Revision (PCR), in 
2004; the Structural Convergence Fund of Mercosur (Fondo para la Convergencia 
Estructural del Mercosur – FOCEM), in the same year; the Mercosur Parliament 
(Parlasur), in 2006; several working groups (to tackle sectorial cooperation); and the 
Social Institute of Mercosur (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA & CULPI, forthcoming). 
Mercosur’s institutional reaction to regional and local demands was, 
nonetheless, a late and uneven response to the processes of regionalization. Although 
the rise of the left did trigger a new approach to regionalism and to regional 
cooperation/integration strategies by enlarging the scope of regional policies to 
include more political and social objectives, it did not translate into a deep, structural 
change within the institutional structure of Mercosur (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA & CULPI, 
forthcoming). Furthermore, Mercosur’s response failed to consider local specificities 
of the border regions (see in more detail in the next section). Hence, the regional 
organism did not achieve to further profound changes into the interactions at the local 
level. 
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Moreover, the resultant ‘overlapping regionalisms’ of the ‘left turn’ were 
characterized by their fluidity in terms of ideology and of national and regional 
political projects (RIGGIROZZI, 2010). Regionalism, thus, coexisted with strong 
nationalism (CHRISTENSEN, 2007) and generated an complex rivalry for the most 
prominent view for the whole of South America, comprising Mercosur (CABALLERO, 
2015). The entrance of Venezuela in Mercosur in 2012, in this sense, raised 
divergences vis-à-vis the consolidation of a single model of regionalism6, and even 
after his passing, president Chávez was able to perpetuate some of his ideas (see 
GOUVEA & MONTOYA, 2014). 
 
The (un)changing reality at the borders 
 
For a long time, border regions have had a history of their own in South 
America. Mercosur’s international borders were not different. They were neglected by 
politicians and were subject to policies under the logics of international limits and of 
national defense. With the rise of the left, however, Mercosur’s members attempted to 
include borders and border regions into the organism’s framework. Also, it is 
important to note that Mercosur’s response to border-related issues evidenced the 
new role of the State in the heart of the regional organism. 
The institution-building process resulted in the creation of two groups with 
the sole objective of promoting border integration: the Border Integration Ad Hoc 
Group (BIAHG), established in 2002; and the Border Integration Work Group (BIWG), 
created in the scope of the FCCR, in 2008. Both groups functioned under the Common 
Market Group (CMG), the most important decisional body of Mercosur (MATIUZZI DE 
SOUZA, 2015a). Within the newly added institutional structures, decentralized 
cooperation and local integration dynamics became important tools for the 
strengthening of the regional organism (cf. VIGEVANI et al., 2011). The social and 
political agenda of Mercosur thus reconsidered borders and border regions as targets 
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regionalism through the enlargement of its regional organism, Alba (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples 
of Our America). 
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for public policies, initiating new processes of institutionalization of such spaces 
within the bloc (RHI-SAUSI & ODDONE, 2011). 
The increase of politico-ideological synergies between progressive presidents 
in the period studied raised ‘trust’ among the parties involved at the borders, as much 
at top-level negotiation as local-level approaches (see DE LOMBAERDE, 2010). The 
‘left turn’ and the consequent inclusion of borders and border regions in the scope of 
Mercosur increased political and economic resources toward border integration, to 
the extent of overcoming some of the common policy challenges, which occurred more 
easily in bilateral relations between the bloc’s members (what Mallmann and Marques 
(2013) refer to as “cooperative behavior”). 
The case of the Integrated Urban Sanitation Project of Aceguá-Brazil and 
Aceguá-Uruguay, funded mainly by FOCEM, and soon to be executed (URUGUAY, 
2013), is the most representative example of the development of joint projects at a 
border region of Mercosur. The progression of the Aceguá project was more a result of 
the rapprochement of Brazil and Uruguay through the set of agreements called New 
Agenda than of the created forums for the development of border integration in 
Mercosur (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2014;2015b). The Brazilian-Uruguayan case served 
as a model for Mercosur and was central in the debates that followed the negotiations 
within the regional organism. 
Moreover, the combination of good presidential relations (which advanced 
bilateral cooperation) and the regional accords toward border integration in 
Mercosur (which placed borders and border regions under the spot of national 
authorities) launched the formation of a new cross-border paradigm (chiefly based on 
the Brazil-Uruguay border region) that led to the attempt to create a regional statute 
of the border, which, in turn, proved to be more contentious and time-consuming than 
imagined by authorities, particularly Brazil (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015a;2015b). 
Indeed, as previous works indicated (FONSECA; VENTURA, 2012; ODDONE, 
2014; RHI-SAUSI & COLETTI, 2010; RHI-SAUSI & ODDONE, 2011; SCHERMA & 
OLIVEIRA, 2014), regionalism in Mercosur in the last decade was marked by the lack 
of coordination of policies between different national structures and also between 
instances of Mercosur, which showed to be a grave problem for the creation and 
implementation of joint policies concerning borders and border regions. Additionally, 
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the problem of coordination was not limited to bilateral relations or to Mercosur’s 
institutional bodies. The coordination problem was also present within national 
structures of governance (CALVENTO, 2014; VIGEVANI, 2006), as well as at the 
subnational, local-level international relations. 
Another dilemma was the absence of appropriate institutional channels for 
bottom-up communication. In the case of Border Integration Ad Hoc Group (BIAHG), 
the top-down logic prevailed at all phases of negotiations, and Mercosur did not 
achieve to stay away of its top-level diplomacy institutional nature. When local voices 
were heard, as was the case of the Border Integration Work Group (BIWG), they did 
not have any weight in the decision-making process within the regional organism, 
even in regards to their own cases (CALVENTO, 2014; MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015a). 
The lack of political convergence similarly hindered institutionalized border 
integration within Mercosur. In the negotiations for the establishment of Mercosur’s 
border statute, each country represented its own project. The high nationalist 
character of the left in South America made impossible for the bloc’s members to 
reach an agreement on the subject (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015a). One of the 
consequences of Mercosur’s structural problems in addressing to border regions’ 
issues is that local authorities cannot consider taking the road of regional politics in 
order to meet any need. For instance, Aceguá’s (Brazil) problem of attending non-
Brazilian bordering populations at the national public health system required, above 
all, a level of lobby in the federal capital of Brasília7. Brazilian national Health Ministry, 
in turn, compiled all similar cases and worked within Mercosur in order to create a 
new organism in the regional bloc that could regulate the procedure for all Brazilian 
bordering towns in accordance to their neighboring health systems. It was the 
creation of the Borders Integrated Health System (SIS-Fronteiras, in Portuguese), in 
2005. 
After almost ten years of the first agreements on the matter, SIS-Fronteiras 
demonstrated similar difficulties to the ones identified previously, with absence of 
systematic foment to cross-border exchange on public health between bordering 
                                                        
7 Interview with PINTO, José (local politician at the border region of Brazil and Uruguay. Interview #1. 
[April, 2015]. Interviewer: Gustavo Matiuzzi de Souza. Aceguá/RS, 2015. 1 arquivo .mp3 (60 min.). 
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conurbations, low level of involvement by local populations, and big distance between 




The ‘left turn’ in South America did provide a new political environment in the 
regional context. Likewise, it is clear that progressive governments of the period had a 
regional project in mind. Hence, it is possible to talk about a ‘regionalism by the left’, 
that is, a regionalism focused on socio-political dynamics to respond to the diverse 
and flourishing societal demands of the last decade. The institutional transformations 
of Mercosur – which for the first time considered, among many other issues, borders 
and border regions within its framework – were, in this context, the translation of this 
‘renewed’ regionalism into a formal political project. 
The political will of leftist national governments in Mercosur, however, were 
not enough to meet the needs for a structural reform of the organism, especially due 
to the mounting discomfort to the idea of losing national autonomy and sovereignty. 
On the contrary, the strong nationalist vein in the heart of the regionalism by the left 
diminished the capabilities of furthering cooperation and integration within Mercosur 
as well as did not improve conditions for further regionalization. Besides, the 
consequent absence of coordination – probably caused by a leadership problem in 
Mercosur (cf. MATTLI, 1999) – hindered regionalism and its effects on regionalization. 
Without implementing deep reforms in the operative system of Mercosur and 
with the concomitant propensity to deal with local demands via bilateral relations and 
accords, ‘regionalism by the left’ did not alter the structure of governance at regional 
level or at local level (as it had proposed in the Consenso de Buenos Aires). In other 
words, the development strategy of Mercosur failed to address the issue of inequality 
and underdevelopment through the engenderment of regional policies. 
As for the regionalization dynamics in Mercosur, particularly at the border 
regions, they seemed to continue residing within informal closed clusters, away from 
the reality of the top-level discussions and negotiations. BIWG was a good start as an 
Conjuntura Global, vol. 4 n.3, set./dez., 2015, p. 390-402. 400 
 





BEASLEY-MURRAY, Jon; Maxwell CAMERON; Eric HERSHBERG. Latin America’s 
Left Turns: A Tour d’Horizon  p.1-22. In: CAMERON, M. e HERSHBERG, E. (Ed.). 
Latin America’s Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010. 
CABALLERO, Sergio Santos. Identity in Mercosur: Regionalism and Nationalism. 
Global Governance, v. 21, n. 1, p. 43-59,  2015. 
CALVENTO, Mariana. La inserción Internacional de los actores subnacionales: 
análisis de un proceso contemporáneo. Interações, v. 15, p. 301-313,  2014. 
CERVO, Amado Luiz; Clodoaldo BUENO. História da Política Exterior do Brasil.  
Brasília: UnB, 2011.  
CHRISTENSEN, Steen Fryba. The influence of nationalism in Mercosur and in 
South America: can the regional integration project survive?. Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional, v. 50, p. 139-158,  2007. 
COUFFIGNAL, Georges. La nouvelle Amérique latine: Laboratoire politique de 
l'Occident.  Paris: Presses de Science Po, 2013.  
DABÈNE, Olivier. Au-delà du régionalisme ouvert: la gauche latino-américaine 
face au piège de la souveraineté e de la flexibilité. In: DABÈNE, O. (Ed.). La gauche 
en Amérique latine. Paris: Presses de Science Po, 2012a. 
______. Introduction: La gauche latino-américaine en action. In: DABÈNE, O. (Ed.). 
La gauche en Amérique latine (1998-2012). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2012b. 
DE LOMBAERDE, Philippe. How to ‘connect’ micro-regions with macro-regions? A 
Note. Perspectives on Federalism, v. 2, n. 3, p. 29-37,  2010. 
FONSECA, Marcela Garcia; Deisy VENTURA. Cooperación descentralizada e 
integración regional: ¿contraposición o complementariedad? Los entes 
subnacionales en la Unión Europea y en Mercosur. TIP - Trabajos de Investigación 
en Paradiplomacia, v. 1, p. 39-54,  2012. 
GOUVEA, Raul; Manuel MONTOYA. Mercosur After Chavez. Thunderbird 
International Business Review, v. 56, n. 6, p. 563-575,  2014. 
HEYMAN, Josiah M; John SYMONS. Borders  p.540-557. In: FASSIN, D. (Ed.). A 
Companion to Moral Anthropology. Chichester - UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2012. 
MALAMUD, Andrés. Presidentialism and Mercosur: A Hidden Cause for A 
Successful Experience  p.53-73. In: LAURSEN, F. (Ed.). Comparative Regional 
Integration: Theoretical Perspectives. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 
Conjuntura Global, vol. 4 n.3, set./dez., 2015, p. 390-402. 401 
 
MALLMANN, Maria Izabel; Teresa Cristina Schneider MARQUES. A crise do 
multilateralismo e o Mercosul: O surgimento de uma nova lógica de integração? 4º 
Encontro Nacional da Associação Brasileira de Relações Internacionais. Belo 
Horizonte, 2013. 
MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, Gustavo. Demandas por regulação na região fronteiriça 
brasilo-uruguaia. Século XXI, v. 5, n. 2, p. 13-32,  2014. 
______. The institutionalization process of border integration in Mercosur (2003-
2015). I International Workshop on Regionalism and Integration Processes in 
Latin America. Université de Liège. Liège, Belgium, 2015a. 
______. Parceria estratégica Brasil-Uruguai no contexto da inserção internacional 
brasileira (2003-2014). Monções, v. 4, n. 7, p. 165-185,  2015b. 
MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, Gustavo; Ludmila CULPI. La réinvention du Mercosur à la 
lumière des synergies politico-idéologiques sud-américaines. In: SANTANDER, S. 
(Ed.). Concurrences régionales dans un monde multipolaire émergent. Bruxelles: 
Peter Lang, forthcoming. 
MATTLI, Walter. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
MERCOSUR. Foro Consultivo de Municípios, Estados Federados, Províncias e 
Departamentos do Mercosul – FCCR: Presidência Pro Tempore Brasileira 2010.  Foz 
do Iguaçú: Secretaria de Relações Institucionais, 2010.  
NOGUEIRA, Vera Maria Ribeiro; Helenara Silveira  FAGUNDES. A implementação 
do SIS Fronteiras: Perspectivas para a ampliação do direito à saúde na fronteira 
arco sul. Serviço Social & Saúde, v. 13, n. 2, p. 245-260,  2014. 
ODDONE, Nahuel. Cooperación Transfronteriza en América Latina: Una 
aproximación teórica al escenario centroamericano desde la experiencia del 
Proyecto Fronteras Abiertas. Oikos, v. 13, n. 2, p. 129-144,  2014. 
RHI-SAUSI, José Luis; Raffaella COLETTI. Cross-border regional integration and 
cooperation in Latin America: experiences and perspectives. Year book for 
decentralised cooperation. Montevideo: Observatorio de Cooperación 
Descentralizada Unión Europea - América Latina: 182-204 p. 2010. 
RHI-SAUSI, José Luis; Nahuel ODDONE. La cooperación transfronteriza entre las 
unidades subnacionales del Mercosur  p.203-217. In: CERQUEIRA FILHO, G. (Ed.). 
Sulamérica - comunidade imaginada: emancipação e integração. Niterói (RJ): 
EdUFF, 2011. 
RIGGIROZZI, Pia. Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: Towards a 
New Synthesis. Latin America Trade Network. Working Paper #130: University of 
Southamptom, 2010. 
RIGGIROZZI, Pia; Diana TUSSIE. The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: the Case 
of Latin America.  London, New York: Springer, 2012.  
SANAHUJA, José Antonio. Del regionalismo abierto al regionalismo post-liberal. 
Crisis y cambio en la integración regional en América Latina. Anuario de la 
integración regional de América Latina y el Gran Caribe, v. 7, p. 12-54,  2009. 
Conjuntura Global, vol. 4 n.3, set./dez., 2015, p. 390-402. 402 
 
SANTANDER, Sebastian. El ‘giro a la izquierda’ en América Latina: Fragmentación 
y recomposición de la geopolítica regional. Cuadernos sobre Relaciones 
Internacionales, Regionalismo y Desarrollo, v. 4, n. 7, p. 17-38,  2009. 
SCHERMA, Márcio Augusto; Jussara Pereira de OLIVEIRA. Integração na fronteira 
Brasil-Uruguai na área da saúde: um panorama. Quinto Congreso Uruguayo de 
Ciencia Política: ¿Qué ciencia política para qué democracia? Montevideo: 
Asociación Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 2014. 
SECRETARIA GENERAL IBEROAMERICANA. Declaración de Asunción. Asunción, 
Paraguay, 2011. 
SÖDERBAUM, Fredrik. Rethinking regions and regionalism. Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs, v. 14, n. 2, p. 9-18,  2013. 
URUGUAY. Gobiernos de Uruguay y Rio Grande do Sul acordaron obras de 
saneamiento en Aceguá.  2013.  Disponível em: < 
http://presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/saneamiento-
acegua >. Acesso em: 10/11/15. 
VIGEVANI, Tullo. Problemas para a atividade internacional das unidades 
subnacionais: estados e municípios brasileiros. Revista Brasileira de Ciências 
Sociais, v. 21, p. 127-139,  2006. 
VIGEVANI, Tullo  et al. Actores locales, cooperación descentralizada y 
fortalecimiento institucional: posibilidades de profundización del Mercosur. 
Anuario de la Cooperación Descentralizada, v. 6, p. 146-168,  2011. 
 
 
 
 
